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Nature. The influence of his metaphysical theories is felt in widely different directions in Mary Whiton Calkins's *Personalistic Conception of Nature*, and, on its dialectical side, in W. H. Sheldon's *Strife of Systems*. His emphasis on religion as a fundamental factor in human experience and civilization reappears not only in G. P. Adams's *Idealism and the Modern Age*, but above all in W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* and *The Remaking of Human Nature*. But Hocking's appointment, as Royce's successor, to the Alford professorship is fitting in an even deeper sense. The tide is at the moment running against idealism, and this has prevented the power and freshness of Hocking's work from being as fully and widely appreciated as they deserve to be. And his own best is yet to come. But all who know even a little of his unpublished studies in the philosophy of the State, of History, and of Art, look to him to be the true heir of Royce and the leader of the idealism of the future.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. S. RADHAKRISHNAN. London and New York: Macmillan Co. 1920. Pp. x + 463.

Professor Radhakrishnan has produced a notable book. Any criticism of the main trend of current Western philosophy, undertaken from the standpoint of Indian thought with its characteristic basis and traditions, could not fail to be noteworthy; but this volume has a special significance. Consider for a moment its title—*The Reign of Religion in Philosophy*. Can such dominance be properly ascribed to religion? Influence—whether waning or increasing is another question—may be conceded; but to what degree this is identical with that direction and control which deserve the name “reign” appears a highly debatable issue. Such a title, again, inevitably arouses certain too familiar reflections; we anticipate criticism, skepticism, even hostility to religious conceptions as such. But on both these points Radhakrishnan takes up an attitude that is refreshingly definite. Approaching his very wide but extremely pertinent subject as an absolutist, he maintains two theses: (1) “of pluralistic theism and monistic idealism, the latter is the more reasonable”; systems marked by “religious neutrality end in absolute idealism. The current pluralistic systems are the outcome of the interference of religious prejudice with the genuine spirit of speculation”;¹ and (2)

¹ But the “realistic reaction,” particularly the realism of Russell, is an exception. Cf. pp. 331, 336.

"monistic idealism is the more reasonable as affording to the spiritual being of man full satisfaction, moral as well as intellectual" (p. vii); thus his criticism is at once positive and comprehensive. Of these two contentions, the first obviously concerns philosophy alone; but his second principle includes a much wider and not so purely philosophic an issue in its claim that only absolutism can satisfy religious needs. For him, as for the poet, "the world glows with God"; if religion can at all be regarded as transcended, this is only in full spiritual satisfaction; it is not negated, not abandoned and wholly discarded; and this, I think, is a somewhat new characteristic in recent absolutistic thought.

In proffering a few remarks on a work which, whatever other judgment may be passed upon it, must be recognized as an extremely able, clear and individual discussion of fundamentals, it may be useful to summarize them as expressing agreement with the author's absolutistic criticism of current pluralisms, together with the impression that this absolutism itself needs somewhat clearer expression in order to guard against its becoming another mere variant of pluralism.

The method adopted by the author is the old and powerful one, in the right hands, of "exposing, through criticism, the absolutistic implications" of the systems (among others) of Ward, Bergson, James, Eucken and Russell; and these names are sufficient to show that he has overlooked little that demands notice in recent thought. But there is here neither lack of appreciation nor the slightest imputation of intellectual dishonesty. On the contrary "recent tendencies in philosophy" (Chap. II.) are traced to an inevitable reaction from that abstract absolutism which, as perhaps James most vehemently argued, derided or at least neglected the demands of average humanity.

Such a protest against mere abstractionism, this recognition of aspects of the human spirit other than the purely intellectual, was at once natural and praiseworthy; but it has had two unhappy consequences. In the first place it selected a radically false criterion in its choice of intuitive belief as the ultimate standard to be at all costs maintained; and Radhakrishnan regards pluralism as nothing more than an unconscious attempt to provide philosophical bases for the instincts of a democratic humanism. "Distrust of intellect is the characteristic note of recent philosophy. Instead of reason-philosophers we have faith-philosophers" (p. 42). They are deeply concerned about the intellectual difficulties and the spiritual trials of that typically modern and pathetically puzzled person, Mr. Britling; if he protests that he can not understand our theories, then they must be false; if they do not pacify his troubled soul their

defectiveness is patent. The further result is equally inevitable; all the "isms" thus proffered for the solace of Mr. Britling can not escape being radically faulty, because their own presuppositions imply that very absolutism which they repudiate. But this innate absolutism is essentially concrete; it "does not dismiss the world of reality as illusory. It is wrong to assume that it cancels the existence of the Many for the sake of the One. All that absolutism says is that the One is the life and soul of the world. This is not to say that the world of life and change is unreal."²

Thus Radhakrishnan has raised anew, and from what is in many ways a novel standpoint, a number of old and much debated issues. The absolutist heavy artillery has reopened with a well-directed barrage, and not without having learned some valuable lessons from the tactics of its opponents. For whatever be the defects of recent pluralism, its advocates have been remarkably successful in rousing wide interest and in infusing reality into discussion. From this both sides alike must benefit; no longer will argument proceed in an academic void; and one outstanding merit of the volume under consideration is the fresh clearness with which the points at issue are presented.

Doubtless a fitting reply will duly be made to its contentions by those who have not yet "outsoared the shadow of our night." I shall content myself therefore with noting those features of absolutism which seem to me most to demand attention from both pluralists and the author himself.

Few of those to whom the subject is perhaps already too familiar can afford to omit his opening chapter on "Science, Religion and Philosophy." There is much truth in "philosophy has become a list of beliefs held by faith and not a reasoned system." But at the same time "religious facts have more significance for philosophy than any other." "Philosophy is not a theory of theory, but a theory of life, at home in life and not in false abstractions. Instead of trying to make philosophy religious, we should make religion philosophical. True religion and true philosophy will agree, for there is no secret hostility between the different sides of human nature."³ At first one is tempted to believe that yet another pluralist is writing; surely we have here a note not always markedly resonant in classic absolutism.

The consideration of the *ad hoc* system of Leibnitz may be passed over briefly. His inclusion seems due to a double reason; first for historic continuity and completeness and secondly because he is a

² Pp. 48, 49. (Slightly modified.) As for Mr. Britling, see the end of section III., p. 42.

³ Pp. 12, 19, 20, 22.

rationalistic pluralist, and therefore a patent exception to that tradition of inherent connection between absolutism and reason on which James was so fond of insisting. Radhakrishnan maintains that an "examination of Leibnitz's theory of perception will enforce absolutism" (p. 61.) In any case the artificialities of the entire system, in spite of the intellectual power that went to its construction, render it a feeble basis for modern pluralism; and to Leibnitz Radhakrishnan affiliates the work of James Ward, thus arriving at the moderns. Ward's position, he points out, has a twofold aspect; he upholds spirit as against naturalism, but as against absolutism, *many* spirits; thus he re-edits the *Monadology* in an attempt "show that by itself pluralism is inadequate and must give place to a theism" (p. 92). His panpsychism, which has always appeared to me the weakest feature in his system, is very forcibly criticized. "We can not follow Ward when he says that in this world we have all persons and no things . . . that matter is mind" (p. 99). For as Radhakrishnan contends further, it is possible to accept Nature, even a completely mechanical Nature, without any necessary contradiction of a spiritual Absolute. Here the absolutist position, as against that taken up by Ward and other panpsychists, is excellently expressed; only the sense that it would be unfair to the author prevents the citation of sentence after sentence which go to the root of the matter. I may refer, however, to the somewhat analogous position held, from the absolutist standpoint itself, by Dr. McTaggart, for whom the ultimate differentiations of the Absolute are finite individuals; it would be interesting to know Radhakrishnan's opinion of this interpretation of Hegelian idealism. It constitutes a crucial test for absolutism, for its acceptance involves serious risks of subjectivism. But "spiritual monism need not be of the panpsychist type" (p. 108); and further, Ward's treatment of ethical freedom implies a fundamental misinterpretation of the function of mechanism in Nature.

The consideration of Ward is remarkably complete without being overdone; besides the points just noted, the implications of his theory are traced in their bearing on life and matter, creation and evolution, the finitude and the personality of God; the final conclusion being that Ward's fear that absolutism "would open the floodgates to mechanism, determinism and other inhumanisms" is completely unfounded. "In escaping from subjective idealism to which pluralism leads, Ward has affirmed absolutism." "Even the most brilliant philosopher can not make pluralism philosophically sound."⁴

⁴ Pp. 134, 120, 147.

The three succeeding chapters are devoted to Bergson, which leads me to venture the opinion that Radhakrishnan, like many others, has taken this remarkable writer rather too seriously. We find, it is true, the severe condemnation of his system as "a cheap and facile monism indifferent to the difficulties of rational philosophy"; the abstract vagueness of "duration" is insisted upon;⁵ nevertheless I think that the most damaging criticism of Bergson can be found in his own work itself. Like that of James, it is a mosaic rather than a true unity; an *ad hoc* construction rather than an organic growth; but with the element of self-contradiction much more accentuated, as any careful analysis is sufficient to show.

I very much doubt, therefore, the truth of the remark that "if freed from its inconsistencies it must end in absolutism"; these "inconsistencies" seem to me so fundamental and deep seated that their removal would involve the destruction of the entire system. Radhakrishnan, however, takes his principal results separately, and here as elsewhere traces their absolutistic implications. As in Ward's case, he finds the theories of perception seriously defective; "the problem is slurred over and not solved" (p. 156); but he does not mention the direct contradiction between Bergson's position in *Time and Free Will* and that in *Matter and Memory*. The careless vagueness in the use of his central terms is another matter for criticism; e.g. he "is not very careful in his use of the word life. Life and consciousness are sometimes used synonymously. Life sometimes refers to vital phenomena" (p. 175). Here we have one of the best aphorisms in the volume: "Matter to Bergson is congealed mind, while to Hegel it is concealed mind" (p. 178). This is excellent, and incidentally it reveals the author's command of his English.

The account of the place which intuition has always held in classical absolutism, and the contrast with Bergson's opposition of intuition to intellect, are equally good. For absolutism, there is no such dichotomy as Bergson asserts; "intuition does not mean a break with ordinary thought, but a completion of the labour of intellect, a comprehension which sees things as a whole."⁶ This is but one instance out of many where the gross misrepresentations of absolutism, so common in its recent critics, are clearly pointed out and corrected.⁷ In this respect, perhaps the strongest card in Bergson's suit is "*tout est donné*"; here again misconception is involved; the

⁵ P. 163; note "rational," not "rationalistic."

⁶ P. 189. Cf. also pp. 196 and 207, and Dr. Bosanquet's remark that this view can not be read into Bergson. (*Principle of Individuality*, p. 168, n.)

⁷ "The absolutism which comes in for severe rebuke at the hands of pluralist critics is a fiction of their own imagination and not a theory held by its recognized exponents" (p. 407).

universe is not a "twice told tale; there is a progressive realization of the absolute in the world" (p. 186). But, as I have said already, perhaps Radhakrishnan takes Bergson, as a philosopher, too seriously; for he concludes "Bergson is more a prophet than a philosopher, a seer than a dialectician. The vision requires a system of absolute idealism" (p. 221).

The sarcasm with which the chapter on "Pragmatism" begins will probably be considered as no more than is deserved by the methods adopted by some of its advocates. On its more serious side, Radhakrishnan points out that while Kant was a pioneer pragmatist, still this did not induce him to "break up the unity of mind. His pure and practical reason are both expressions of reason" (p. 228), a feature often overlooked by those who rely on the supposed insufficiency of the Kantian pure reason. Throughout a fairly long chapter Radhakrishnan succeeds in presenting some novel aspects of this much debated subject. He is as severe on Kant as on James, while he gives full expression to such concessions as absolutism need make, and traces accurately the factors in recent controversy which almost necessitated the new movement. The principal defect of the chapter is the oversight of those expressions of absolutist thinkers on the nature of truth, uttered long before the pragmatists began to emphasize its practical aspects, whose due recognition would have deprived their contentions in advance of much of their force.⁸ On the other hand, the insistence on the inevitable subjectivity of pragmatism is very forcible. "True pragmatism inclines towards absolutism, which has long ago given up the idea of the Absolute as a static entity existing alongside the actual" (p. 251).

It is in his pluralism that William James is most distinctively to be found, and *A Pluralistic Universe* is the subject of another long chapter. Radhakrishnan is quite right, I think, in locating "the greatest defect of James's philosophy in its unsystematic nature" (p. 255). But all his work seems to contain evidence of hasty reading (to say the least) of absolutist literature, of which Radhakrishnan gives several instances; his account of the relation between the Absolute and finite individuals; of the monistic "all" as opposed to, instead of complementing, the pluralistic "each"; of the Absolute as static rather than dynamic; passage after passage is shown to be defective either in its bases or its implications. And in spite of the indebtedness which James expresses to Bergson, they "have different views of intellect. It is surprising that James does not realize that the adoption of Bergson's theory commits him to the conceptual method" (pp. 268-269).

⁸ Cf. my *Examination of James's Philosophy*, pp. 16-18.

As for the constructive side of James's work, does this, Radhakrishnan asks, really guarantee "freedom and novelty, a God who is of real help, and personal immortality?" He thinks not, after all; "such a God is too human for any religious purpose" (p. 285). And his vacillations on moral freedom, in conjunction with his abstract view-point, forced an unreal alternative between chance and fatalism, and so, but only as a *pis aller*, the selection of chance as more favorable to freedom. Finally, the theory of pure experience excludes any persistent soul; but on the other hand, if we fall back on the panpsychism of Fechner we drift into a "mother-sea of consciousness" which again is "incompatible with a radical pluralism" (p. 296). Certainly James was never himself anxious about his own reputation as a thinker, and therefore his fate need concern us still less; but it is impossible to resist the feeling that, while he "has secured a permanent place in the republic of great philosophers," it is no less a misfortune in the interests of philosophy itself, that "he was not very scrupulous about the logic of his position; he was at the mercy of the latest fad" (pp. 296, 297). We may indeed regard this as a tribute to his real power, since such irresponsibility would have proved the ruin of any weaker man.

The other recent critics of absolutism—Russell, Balfour, Howison, Schiller, Eucken—are all dealt with with equal thoroughness; but I should like to turn to Radhakrishnan's own exposition of monistic idealism.

Every such endeavor courts distinctive and grave dangers. To insist on the differentiations demanded by a really concrete absolutism means the risk of pluralism; if, in avoiding this, the thinker emphasizes the equally necessary transcendence, he may lose his particulars in abstraction; the underlying unity of these particulars, again, must be something other than themselves, without being external or artificial on the one hand, or on the other so merged with them as to become a pantheism, not to say a panpsychism. So far as the present volume is constructive (and its main purpose is critical) it stands all these tests excellently. Its chief failing, curiously enough, seems to me to be a tendency toward pluralism; but this may easily be more apparent than real, and will doubtless receive due consideration in Radhakrishnan's future constructive work. Or it may arise from his intense sympathy with religion, even as in its Western rather than its peculiarly Oriental phases. The highest religion, he maintains, is permeated by, and must if needs be fall back upon, absolutism;⁹ this again fosters and conserves religion as such, not any mere intellectualism nor even passive

⁹ "If philosophy takes into account facts of religious consciousness we will be led to the absolutist theory" (p. 283).

mysticism and absorption. As being in agreement with this attitude he cites, quite properly of course, both Hegel and Bradley; but he is himself much more definite, much less vague and distant; perhaps from temperament he seems less afraid of the reproach of wearing his heart on his sleeve. Thus we find in the final chapter alone:¹⁰ "The world glows with God. . . . A central spirit, an infinite and eternal spiritual energy, purposeful and intelligent. All things are real only as they exist in God." And thus, in view of the two dangers already alluded to—of pluralism on one side, and of panpsychism on the other—it is not surprising that an unconscious tendency towards the former seems to manifest itself.

But before dealing with this major difficulty I should like to discuss a few minor points.¹¹ The first concerns the use of the term "idea," which together with "ideal" is the source of more misunderstanding of Idealism than any other. "Ideal" is almost always construed in the moral or esthetic sense of a standard which ought to be, but never is, actual; while "idea" is interpreted wholly subjectively, instead of objectively as in accordance with both Platonic usage and Hegelian logic; and the few references which Radhakrishnan makes to "idea" seem to me to convey this erroneous subjective meaning. We have *e.g.* (p. 34), "the idealist doctrine that the world is an idea is a sham. How can the world be looked upon as a dream or imagination?" Then (p. 46), "Absolutism which makes mind the central reality," and p. 95, "The Absolute Idea, which is the sole reality" (in reference to Hegel). What seems lacking here is the principle that for Hegel the Absolute and the Absolute Idea are not wholly identical. He regarded neither mind (as such) nor the Absolute Idea as the ultimate reality. These are the logical—the thought—aspects of reality, which itself is something richer than they, being Spirit. The altogether erroneous impression that Hegel regards all reality as Thought or as Mind accounts, I think, for much of the repugnance felt towards it; and it would materially help forward the comprehension of absolutism if Radhakrishnan were to make this essential distinction clearer than he has done; as it is he appears to use mind and spirit as synonymous.¹²

¹⁰ In this Radhakrishnan develops the standpoint of Indian metaphysics as "the earliest form of speculative idealism in the world" (p. 451).

¹¹ Perhaps I may add here a contradiction which I feel sure, however, is purely superficial. We have (p. 254): "In philosophy we do not seek for faith and vision but for a reasoned explanation"; but p. 441: "Philosophy is neither purely conceptualist, not purely empiricist, but is intuitional."

¹² The distinction only, for the principle itself is fully recognized. *Cf.* p. 82: "Reality is a concrete spiritual whole"; also pp. 97, 101, 135, 139, 304, 352, 434; as to the distinction itself, I may refer to Dr. McTaggart's *Commentary*, sec. 294.

Nor do I feel satisfied with his exposition of Hegel's theory of being and becoming on p. 168. There we have, "being relates itself to non-being, and passes with it into the higher category of becoming." But Hegel did not pass from being to non-being; the transit is from being to nothing (or nought). This distinction may seem mere hair-splitting, but it is in reality fundamental. "Non-being" is the denial of "being"; while "nothing" is the acceptance of "being," but the denial of any "determination." Thus the former is a direct logical contradictory, which absolutely nullifies thought; while the second is the dialectic transition which is just as absolutely indispensable to thought.¹³

But these are after all only minor points; the final question is: Does Radhakrishnan succeed in his detailed exposition of the principle of the Absolute? I think that on the whole his treatment is excellent. The Absolute, in the first place, is concrete—"the highest concrete"—"which holds to the reality of both eternal and temporal, victory of the good and a battle with evil, consciousness of perfection, and a moral will." Secondly, his interpretation is but "the outlines of a scheme" (which still "appears to satisfy philosophic needs and impulses"),¹⁴ so that too much must not be expected from it. But I find it extremely difficult, after careful comparison, to distinguish his treatment of the relation between the Absolute, God, and the universe, from that which he quotes (and adversely criticizes) from Rashdall and, in a less degree, A. J. Balfour.¹⁵ These passages are too long to give, and each reader will form his own opinion; but on the questions of evil and imperfection, personality and creation, the parallel appears very close between Radhakrishnan's absolutism and that pluralism which in other writers he condemns; and, in the words of James, "the difference between monism and pluralism is the most pregnant in philosophy."

I will contrast a few brief sentences: "No pluralism can be consistent unless subordinated to a monism which will make God not a person . . . but an impersonal or suprapersonal spirit." Here then, quite definitely, God can not be a person.¹⁶ But as against this, we find "The Absolute breaks up its wholeness and develops the reality of self and not-self. The self is God . . . The personal God

¹³ Cf. again *Commentary*, sec. 16. Again, in saying that "Rashdall adopts the traditional argument of idealism" (p. 392), I think that Radhakrishnan means Berkeleyan Idealism. Pringle-Pattison, following Trendelenburg, similarly criticizes Hegel; but his illustration is obviously inapposite. *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 99, note.

¹⁴ Pp. 440, 313, 411.

¹⁵ Pp. 392-395, 402-404.

¹⁶ P. 277; but cf. also p. 382.

is not the Absolute, but its highest manifestation"; while, on the other hand, "the Absolute constitutes the self of the whole world," without any "breaking up" whatever. "Breaks up," indeed, appears an unfortunate term wherewith to express the truth that "the universe is the Absolute dynamically viewed"; but I have no doubt that, in his future work, the author will clear up these obscurities, and present the Absolute as itself "the whole, the only individual, the sum of all perfection."¹⁷ I have dealt with his present volume at such length because in it Absolutism, after a comparatively long interval of silence and neglect, once more takes up the gage of conflict and offers itself as the surest guardian of man's highest artistic, moral and religious interests.

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REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Avril-Juin, 1920. *Conscience et fonction sociale* (pp. 127-150): G. BELOT. - The so-called economic and political problems of our day are fundamentally moral problems, and what is needed for their solution is a moral education which will adjust the demands of conscience to the actual circumstances of the present environment. *La valeur des Idées de A. Comte sur la chimie* (pp. 151-179): G. URBAIN. - A. Comte's view that the positive science of chemistry aims at the "prevision of reactions" seems to be in accord with modern developments of the principles of Mayer and Carnot. But Comte, leaping into a religious vein, was too enthusiastic over the prospect of unifying the science under a single principle, for there seem to be two sets of chemical data. In the one set, which embraces thermodynamically unstable compounds such as the organic compounds, "the reversibility of reactions is the exception, and this is the domain par excellence of atomistic doctrines"; in the other set, which embraces thermodynamically stable compounds, "the reversibility of reactions is the rule, and this is the domain par excellence of energetic doctrines." In spite of this dual character of its data, which prevents the formulation of some single first principle, chemistry can be just as rational and fruitful as any scientific positivist could wish. *L'antidogmatisme de Kant et de Fichte* (pp. 181-224): M. GUÉROULT. - Fichte's conception of "dogmatism" and the "idealism" which he substitutes for it correspond substantially with Kantian ideas on the same subjects. This is shown by the fundamental agreement be-

¹⁷ Pp. 444, 435, 445, 442.